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Abstract: In this paper we emphasize the importance of unique certiﬁed one-time key pairs in Buyer-Seller Watermark-
ing (BSW) protocols. We distinguish between reactive unbinding attacks, in which the seller reacts to illicit
ﬁle sharing by fabricating further evidence of such activity, and pre-emptive unbinding attacks, in which the
seller gains an advantage by taking action that pre-empts the ﬁle being shared. We demonstrate the importance
of certiﬁed one-time key pairs in the BSW protocol by Lei et al., for protecting against pre-emptive unbinding
attacks, and subsequently reveal a new attack on a recently published BSW protocol due to its omission of
unique key pairs.
1 INTRODUCTION
Copy deterrence mechanisms discourage illicit dupli-
cation and dissemination of copyrighted material by
embedding an imperceptible identifying mark within
content to trace any illicit ﬁle sharing back to the orig-
inal owner (?).
However, the buyer must be assured that the copy-
right owner has proof if and only if an illegal act has
taken place. The assurance that evidence cannot be
fabricated against a buyer is known in the literature as
customers’ rights (?).
Qiao and Nahrstedt observed that previous
schemes, in which the seller chose the watermark,
failed to protect the copyright. Even if a seller had
acted honestly, and is convinced of the buyer’s illegal
activity, the seller remains unable to prove that it was
not they that had leaked the watermarked content.
Memon and Wong proposed a Buyer-Seller Wa-
termarking (BSW) protocol that aimed to resolve this
customers’ rights issue by withholding knowledge
of the watermark or watermarked content from the
seller (?). However, Lei et al. later uncovered an is-
sue present in the Memon-Wong (MW) protocol that
they termed the unbinding problem (?). They subse-
quently proposed their own protocol, their approach
to prevent unbinding was twofold: bind a watermark
to content using some signed message; and use one-
time key pairs to avoid outdated information being
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used in subsequent transactions.
In this paper we distinguish between two forms of
unbinding, reactive and pre-emptive, and emphasise
the importance of one-time key pairs in preventing the
latter of these.
In Section ?? we provide background material on
the MW protocol and the unbinding problem pre-
sented by Lei et al. and then distinguish between two
forms of unbinding in Section ??. The importance
of one-time key pairs is demonstrated in Section ??,
subsequently a pre-emptive unbinding attack on a re-
cently published protocol is presented in Section ??.
Finally we discuss the danger in entrusting buyer’s
to randomly generate key pairs in Section ?? before
drawing conclusions in Section ??. The Appendix
provides a summary of the notation used throughout
this paper.
2 THE UNBINDING PROBLEM
In this section we describe the protocol proposed
in (?) and the associated unbinding problem pre-
sented in (?).
The approach taken in (?) to resolve the cus-
tomers’ rights issue, was to restrict the seller to con-
duct the watermark embedding in the encrypted do-
main, using the properties of homomorphic encryp-
tion. Knowledge of the watermark and watermarked
content are withheld from the seller during embed-
ding and thus the buyer cannot claim that a copy was
released by the seller.
During the watermark generation phase of the
protocol, the buyer receives encrypted watermarks
from a trusted third party, signed to certify they are
well-formed. The third party need not be involved in
transactions between the buyer and seller thus he is
said to be ofﬂine (?). Furthermore, the third party is
not required to store any data.
In the watermark insertion phase of the protocol,
the buyer initiates a transaction sending to the seller
some encrypted watermark, Sskt (Epkb(w)), generated
and signed by a trusted third party during the water-
mark generation phase. The seller must also receive
an indication of what cover material the buyer wishes
to purchase, arg(c), and certiﬁcation of the buyer’s
public key. The encrypted watermark signed by the
certiﬁcation authority is also sent to the seller.
As the seller is now in possession of the encrypted
watermark Epkb(w) and can calculate the encrypted
content Epkb(c), they construct the encrypted digi-
tal content Epkb(Wwks(c,w)) by performing the em-
bedding in the encrypted domain2. The seller pro-
duces Epkb(Wwks(c,w)) without ever knowing the wa-
termark or the watermarked content in the clear.
It should be possible, once an illicitly shared ﬁle
is intercepted by the seller, for the original owner to
be traced and this proven to an arbitrator. The proto-
col relies on the buyer participating in the arbitration
process, however if a buyer refuses to do so it is con-
sidered admission of guilt.
The protocol was shown to be ﬂawed in (?). Lei et
al. presented an unbinding problem apparent once the
user has illicitly shared content. Should a single ﬁle
be shared by a buyer, the seller may react by embed-
ding this watermark into any other content in order to
fabricate evidence of further illicit ﬁle sharing against
the buyer.
Upon completion of a transaction in which they
purchase the content C1 with watermark W , the
buyer B receives the encrypted watermarked content
EpkB(WwkS(C1,W )). Should B upload the decrypted
content WwkS(C1,W ) onto some ﬁle sharing network
the seller S may later download the content and ex-
tract W in order to trace the piracy back to B. How-
ever, once S has extracted W they may embed it
within some other contentC2 to produceWwkS(C2,W ).
Thus the evidence of illicit ﬁle sharing of C2 (i.e.,
WwkS(C2,W ) and SskT (EpkB(W ))) can be obtained by
S at a time when C2 has not been shared.
2An indexing watermark v is ﬁrst embedded to avoid an
exhaustive search being performed. A permutation function
σ is then applied whilst embedding the watermark c in the
encrypted domain such that the buyer cannot know the sig-
nal embedded.
3 REACTIVE AND PRE-EMPTIVE
UNBINDING
Lei et al. also describe another form of unbinding
attack in which the seller gains an advantage by taking
action that pre-empts a ﬁle being shared.
Upon completing a transaction in which they
purchase the content C1 with watermark W1, the
buyer B receives the encrypted watermarked con-
tent EpkB(WwkS(C1,W1)). However, during a sec-
ond transaction, in which B wishes to purchase the
content C2 with watermark W2, the seller S may
choose to distribute the encrypted watermarked con-
tent EpkB(WwkS(C2,W1)) to B. Should B ever share
the latter content then S may extract the watermark
W1 and embed it within the content C1. Thus the ev-
idence of illicit ﬁle sharing of C1 (i.e., WwkS(C1,W1)
and SskT (EpkB(W1))) can be obtained by S at a time
when C1 has not been shared.
In the ﬁrst attack scenario, described in Sec-
tion ??, the malicious seller reacts to the ﬁle sharing
maliciously by subsequently extracting the watermark
from the shared ﬁle and embedding it within another.
This is only possible after the ﬁle sharing event has
occurred. In this paper we shall refer to such an un-
binding attack as Reactive Unbinding. This is as op-
posed to what we shall refer to as Pre-emptive Un-
binding in which the seller gains an advantage by tak-
ing action that pre-empts the ﬁle being shared. The
two attacks are only subtly different in the MW pro-
tocol, but we shall see that Lei et al. adopt different
mechanisms to prevent each of the two forms of un-
binding.
4 THE IMPORTANCE OF
ONE-TIME KEY PAIRS
The approach taken in (?) to prevent unbinding, as
illustrated in Figure ??, was twofold: bind a water-
mark to content using some signed message; and use
one-time key pairs to avoid outdated information be-
ing used in subsequent transactions.
The one-time key pairs were proposed as a mech-
anism to prevent pre-emptive unbinding, although
other papers refer to them as anonymous keys such as
(?), (?) and (?). It is out of the scope of this paper
to consider anonymity; instead we will demonstrate
the importance of one-time key pairs for the overall
security of the scheme.
A,PK,skb ,Cskca (pkb),{arg(c)∣c←CV},KP∗
Buyer b
A,PK,sks ,wks,CV
Seller s
A,PK,skt ,WM
TTP t
arg ∈ {arg(c)∣c←CV}
(pkb∗ ,skb∗) ∈ KP∗
Cskca(pkb),Cskb(pkb∗)
arg,Sskb∗ (arg) Cskb(pkb∗),char(c)
arg,Sskb∗ (arg)
w ∈WM
Epkb∗ (w),Epkt (w)
Sskt (Epkb∗ (w), pkb∗ ,Sskb∗ (arg))Epkb∗ (Wwks(c,w))
Figure 1: LYTC protocol.
4.1 Lei-Yu-Tsai-Chan (LYTC) Protocol
Figure ?? illustrates the LYTC protocol. The trusted
third party is online during each run of the proto-
col, generating a unique watermark for each trans-
action. The buyer initiates the protocol by sending
Sskb∗ (arg(c)) to the seller, indicating the content they
wish to receive. An anonymous certiﬁcate, signed by
a certiﬁcation authority, is sent from the buyer to the
seller to certify the buyer’s public key, Cskca(pkb), al-
though a standard digital certiﬁcate may be used if
privacy is not a concern.
The buyer constructs a one-time public-secret key
pair (pkb∗ ,skb∗) as the unique key pair used during
the current transaction. This ensures that outdated in-
formation cannot be used in subsequent transactions
and thus prevents pre-emptive unbinding. The buyer
certiﬁes the public key by constructing a second digi-
tal certiﬁcateCskb(pkb∗). The key pkb∗ is immediately
used to verify the signed agreement sent by the buyer.
Upon veriﬁcation of the signed agreement, the
seller forwardsCskb(b∗, pkb∗) and Eskb∗ (arg(c)) to the
third party. In order to ensure the watermark is suit-
ably robust the seller also sends some characteristics
char(c) of the cover material3.
The trusted third party then constructs a robust
watermark that is unique to this transaction. They
use the public key received in the digital certiﬁcate
Cskb(pkb∗) to encrypt the watermark ready for use by
3Lei et al. state that the seller may send the content c if
unconcerned about doing so. Evidence of illicit ﬁle sharing
can be fabricated by any agent in possession of the cover
material and watermark. Hence, the third party must not
know the cover material as they choose the watermark.
the seller. It is sent along with the public key used to
encrypt it and bound to the signed agreement by the
trusted third party by signing a message constructed
of all three components. It is this message that pre-
vents reactive unbinding. They also encrypt the wa-
termark under their own secret key in case they need
to verify the watermark in the arbitration process.
Finally, the seller constructs the watermarked con-
tent in the encrypted domain. Once the buyer has re-
ceived the encrypted, watermarked content they are
able to decrypt in order to gain the useful water-
marked content that they wished to purchase.
4.2 Omitting One-time Key Pairs
By binding the watermark to the cover material via the
signed message Sskt (Epkb∗ (w), pkb∗ ,Sskb∗ (arg)), Lei
et al. prevent the malicious seller from performing
a reactive unbinding attack. However, this message
alone does not protect against pre-emptive unbinding.
Let us suppose that the key pair need not be
unique, then a buyer B may use the same key pair
(pkB∗ ,skB∗) in multiple transactions. Consider the
ﬁrst piece of content C+ purchased as more ex-
pensive than a second piece of content C−. In
the ﬁrst transaction the seller S receives the signed
message SskT (EpkB∗ (W ), pkB∗ ,SskB∗ (arg(C
+))) be-
fore distributing the encrypted watermarked content
EpkB∗ (WwkS(C
+,W )) to B.
Subsequently in a second run of the protocol B
purchases C− using the same key pkB∗ . As such, S
omits the communication with the trusted third party
T and instead embeds the same encrypted watermark
EpkB∗ (W ) as in the ﬁrst transaction.
Should S ever intercept an illicitly shared
copy of the less expensive watermarked content
WwkS(C−,W ) then W can be extracted and em-
bedded into the higher priced content to produce
WwkS(C+,W ). This, along with the signed message
received signed message from the ﬁrst transaction
SskT (EpkB∗ (W ), pkB∗ ,SskB∗ (arg(C
+))), is then consid-
ered sufﬁcient evidence of illicit ﬁle sharing of the
more expensive content, when in fact the less expen-
sive watermarked content was illicitly shared.
Should the encryption key pkB∗ be unique to each
transaction then it is not possible for the seller to per-
form the watermark embedding using an outdated en-
crypted watermark associated with a previous trans-
action. Hence, the uniqueness of the one-time key
pairs must be assured for the LYTC protocol is not
vulnerable to pre-emptive unbinding.
Before discussing how this impacts other BSW
protocols in Section ??, we ﬁrst present a pre-emptive
unbinding attack on a recently published protocol.
5 A PRE-EMPTIVE UNBINDING
ATTACK ON THE HU-ZHANG
(HZ) PROTOCOL
Lei et al. included one-time key pairs to prevent pre-
emptive unbinding. In this section we shall identify,
for the ﬁrst time, a pre-emptive unbinding attack on
the Hu-Zhang (HZ) protocol due to the omission of
one-time key pairs, as illustrated in Figure ??.
5.1 Hu-Zhang (HZ) Protocol
In (?) a protocol was proposed aiming to increase the
efﬁciency of multiple transactions. The trusted third
party is not required to be online during a transac-
tion between the buyer and the seller. As such the
HZ protocol is subject to two phases, similar to the
MW protocol: the watermark generation phase; and
the watermark insertion phase.
In the watermark generation phase, Hu and Zhang
propose the novel idea of enabling the buyer to re-
quest multiple signed encrypted well-formed water-
marks at once. Upon receipt of the buyers digital cer-
tiﬁcateCskca(b, pkb) and the quantity n of watermarks
required, the trusted third party randomly generates
n unique watermarks w1,w2, . . .wn ∈ WM. Each is
encrypted using the public key pkb of the buyer and
signed, along with the same public key. Thus for each
watermark wi a message Epkb(wi),Sskt (pkb,Epkb(wi))
is sent from the trusted third party to the buyer along
with certiﬁcation of the buyer’s public key.
In the watermark insertion phase the buyer
chooses which watermark from the generation phase
to use for the current transaction. The buyer sends to
the seller a common agreement, along with a signa-
ture used to bind the watermark to the cover material,
in the message arg,Sskb(Epkb(w),arg). This is sent
with messages mw and mb, received in the watermark
generation phase. The seller veriﬁes the signatures
and embeds the watermark in the encrypted domain,
sending the result Epkb(Wwks(c,w)) to the buyer.
5.2 A Pre-emptive Unbinding Attack
One-time key pairs are not used in (?) and no alterna-
tive mechanism for preventing pre-emptive unbinding
is provided, which leads to the following attack:-
Upon completing a transaction in which they
purchase the content C+ with watermark W , the
buyer B receives the encrypted watermarked content
EpkB(WwkS(C+,W )). During a second transaction, in
which the B purchases less expensive content C− the
seller S ignores the watermark received but instead
embeds W received in the ﬁrst transaction. Finally,
the seller distributes the encrypted watermarked con-
tent EpkB(WwkS(C−,W )).
Should the buyer share the less expensive content,
S may extractW and embed it within the more expen-
sive content C+. Thus evidence of illicit ﬁle sharing
of C+ (i.e., WwkS(C+,W ), SskB(EpkB(W ),arg(C+))
and SskT (pkB,EpkB(W ))) can be obtained by the seller
at a time when C+ has not been shared.
This attack closely follows the pre-emptive un-
binding attack on the MW protocol described in Sec-
tion ??. It differs only in what constitutes sufﬁcient
evidence of ﬁle sharing. It demonstrates that signing
a message to bind the watermark to the cover mate-
rial does not alone prevent unbinding as a mechanism
also needs to be adopted to avoid outdated informa-
tion being used in subsequent transactions.
Any BSW protocol that fails to adopt a mecha-
nism for avoiding pre-emptive unbinding is vulnera-
ble to attack. It has been demonstrated in (?) and (?)
that the protocol proposed in (?) is ﬂawed, however it
is also vulnerable to the pre-emptive unbinding attack
described in this section.
6 ASSURING KEY PAIRS ARE
USED ONLY ONCE
From the customers’ right issue, Qiao and Nahrst-
edt observed that watermarking schemes in which the
seller chose the watermark to be embedded failed to
protect the copyright (?). Should the seller fail to
A,PK,skt ,WM
TTP t
A,PK,skb ,Cskca (b, pkb),{arg(c)∣c←CV}
Buyer b
A,PK,sks,wks ,CV
Seller s
Watermark Generation Phase
n ∈ ℕ
n,Cskca(pkb)
w1,w2, . . .wn ∈WM
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Figure 2: HZ protocol.
address this issue an arbitrator is unable to discern
whether it is the buyer or seller that has acted ma-
liciously. Thus, it is in the interest of a dishonest
buyer to act in a manner that renders themselves vul-
nerable to an attack as they may as a consequence
construct a plausible denial of the illicit ﬁle sharing
they wish to perform. In (?), the protocol proposed
in (?) was shown to be vulnerable to unbinding if the
buyer leaves himself open to attack. The buyer can
then share ﬁles without the seller being able to prove
precisely which ﬁles were shared and escape prosecu-
tion. Although unbinding is only possible once a ﬁle
is shared, the fabrication of evidence implies a failure
to resolve the customers’ rights issue.
As it is in the interest of the buyer for the pro-
tocol to fail to protect their rights, this implies it is
in their interest to leave themselves vulnerable to un-
binding. We demonstrated in Section ?? that the res-
olution of the customers’ rights issue in (?) is de-
pendent upon the uniqueness one-time key pairs. An
unbinding attack is possible on the LYTC protocol
should the same key pair be used in multiple trans-
actions. A similar vulnerability in (?) was presented
in (?) As preventing pre-emptive unbinding is depen-
dent upon the uniqueness of the one-time key pairs it
is apparent that entrusting the random generation of
one-time key pairs to the buyer puts the protocol’s se-
curity at risk.
A natural choice of whom ensures the uniqueness
of key pairs thus becomes the seller. The digital cer-
tiﬁcate Cskb(pkb∗) must be checked against all other
certiﬁcates used in previous transactions. Duplicate
certiﬁcates must be rejected and the seller may later
be required to prove this action to the arbiter. These
may not be trivial tasks if the protocol is deployed on a
large scale e-commerce system in which a great num-
ber of certiﬁcates must be stored and cross referenced
in each transaction.
7 CONCLUSIONS
One time key pairs are the mechanism adopted by Lei
et al. to avoid pre-emptive unbinding attacks in which
the seller gains an advantage by taking action that pre-
empts the ﬁle being shared. We have demonstrated
that the omission of one time key-pairs from a BSW
protocol leaves it vulnerable to a pre-emptive unbind-
ing attack. This led to our discovery of an attack on
the recently published HZ protocol that had not pre-
viously been identiﬁed, as described in Section ??.
In Section ?? we justiﬁed why the buyer must not
be left to ensure that a unique key pair is used in each
transaction as it is in their interest to use duplicates.
We therefore conclude that the seller must verify the
uniqueness of key pairs unless such action becomes
unmanageable wherein an alternative approach to as-
suring key uniqueness must be proposed.
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APPENDIX
The following notation is used throughout.
• A set of all agents
• WM,CV sets of all watermarks and cover material re-
spectively
• PK set of all public keys
• KP∗ set of all one-time key pairs
• b,s, t,ca variables to model agents, respectively buyers,
sellers, trusted third parties and certiﬁcation authorities
• w,c variables to model watermarks and content taken
from the set of all watermarksWM and set of all digital
content CV , respectively
• (pka,ska) public-secret key pair belonging to agent a
• wks watermarking key belonging to seller s
• arg(c) common agreement identifying content c
• Cskca(a, pka) digital certiﬁcate binding an agent to their
public key signed under skca
• Cskca(pka) anonymous certiﬁcate signed under skca
• Sska(m) message m signed under ska
• Epka(m) message m encrypted under pka
• Wwks(c,w) watermark w embedded within c using wa-
termarking key wks
Lowercase values are considered variable whereas
those in uppercase are concrete. Protocols are pre-
sented as message sequence charts (?) in conjunction
with this notation.
